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h i g h l i g h t s
• A new cascading failure model with an improved breakdown probability is proposed.
• Corresponding to the new model, a protection strategy is proposed.
• We quantify how much the protection resources should be allocated to each node.
• Compared with WR model, our model can make the network more robust with the same cost.
• The advantage of the current model is more obvious in scale-free networks.
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a b s t r a c t
The robustness of complex network is a core issue in complex network research. We
agree that not all overload nodes will be removed from the network in real networks
because some effective measures can be taken to protect them. But only a few researches
consider this issue. Based on previous researches, we propose a cascading model with an
improved breakdown probability. Different from previous breakdown probability model,
the current model brings in some parameters to explore the optimal distribution strategy
of the protection resources. Furthermore, we quantify the allocation of the protection
resources. We explore the relationship between the parameters of our cascading model
and the robustness of three networks (two typical networks and one real network), based
on which we find out the optimal value of the parameter. It in turn helps us to quantify the
allocation of protection resources and form an optimal protection strategy. Our work may
be helpful for improving the robustness of complex networks.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Infrastructure networks, such as power grids [1,2], transportation networks [3,4] and computer networks [5] etc., play
an important role in human society. Cascading failures can happen in many infrastructure networks [6]. The robustness of
these networks directly affects the quality of people’s lives. These networks provide great convenience for our life. However,
a disastrous incident in these infrastructure networks may lead to a cascading breakdown of the whole network and serious
economic consequences [7]. So cascading failure on a network has been a great concern and widely investigated.
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As is known to all, there exists the load on nodes in many complex networks [8]. Hence the failure of nodes can cause the
redistribution of the load of failure nodes. And it will make the load of some nodes exceed their capacities, which can lead to
further overload failures and load-redistribution and finally result in the collapse of the entire network. In order to improve
the robustness of complex networksmany researchers do a lot of effort inmany aspects andmake great progress. Several im-
portant properties shared bymost networks have been discovered, such as the small-world (SW) and scale-free (SF) proper-
ties [9–11]. The construction of cascading failuremodel is necessary, andmanymodels have been proposed and studied [12].
The global load-based cascadingmodel [13–20] has beenwidely used to improve the robustness of networks. Many scholars
define the initial load of a node as the betweenness of the node [1,18]. Considering that transmission paths can be adjusted by
arbitrarily given link weights, Yang et al. [19] define the initial load of a node as the total number of weighted shortest paths
passing through the node. However, calculating the betweenness of a node needs the global informationwhich is not readily
available in large-scale network. So some researchers define the initial load of a node as a function of its degree [17,20]. And
the capacity of a node is usually assumed to be proportional to its initial load [1,7,17,20–22]. Li et al. [23] did not agree with
the linear correlation between extra capacity and initial load andproposed anovel allocationmechanismof limited resources
of capacity against cascading failures. Moreover, Kim et al. [24] find that the node with smaller capacity tends to have larger
unoccupied portions of the capacity in real networks. Furthermore, load-redistribution strategy [20,25] has been discussed
in literature. However, in many researches cited above, the node is immediately removed as long as the load of the node ex-
ceeds its capacity. In fact, not all overload nodeswill be removed from the network owing to certainmonitoring and effective
measures [26]. Anghel et al. [27] claim that the power lines do not fail immediately after being overloaded. That allows for
control schemes such as the one in Ref. [13], which are predicted to greatly reduce the avalanche size. Wang et al. [26] pro-
pose a new cascadingmodel with a breakdown probability, where a newparameter γ is used to represent the removal prob-
ability of an overload node. And the parameter γ is the same for all nodes. Moreover, they did not give a protection strategy
corresponding to the cascading model with a breakdown probability. In fact, to prevent the overload nodes being removed
from the network, some effective measures should be taken. But the effective measures are severely limited by cost in real
networks. There is no need to protect all the nodes in the same strength. A fundamental concern is how to efficiently allocate
limited resources to prevent the overload nodes being removed from the network and make the network more robust.
To this end, we raise a new model for cascading failure with an improved breakdown probability and then propose
a protection strategy corresponding to the new model to allocate the protection resources. In this paper we try to use this
model to explore the effect of some parameters on the robustness of network and figure out a reasonable strategy to allocate
the protection resources. Moreover, we quantify how much the protection resources should be allocated to each node.
Taking into account the very common and conspicuous features, the small-world (SW) and scale-free (SF) properties [18],
we investigate the effect of our model on the robustness of two typical networks (WS network [9] and BA network [10]).
And the simulation results show the relationship between the robustness level of complex networks and some parameters
in our cascading model. Furthermore, we find out the optimal value of the parameter and quantify the allocation of the
protection resources. Our findings may be useful in allocating the protection resources over the whole network to decrease
the influence of the cascading failure. Finally,we examine the effectiveness of the currentmodel on improving the robustness
of the airport network against cascading failures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe the cascading model in detail. Simulations and
discussions based on our model are presented in Section 3. And in Section 4, some summaries and conclusions are given.
2. Cascading model and protection strategy
For concreteness, we consider the cascading model proposed in Ref. [26], which is defined as follows. The initial load
of node j is Lj(0) = (kjm∈Γj km)θ , where Lj(0) is the initial load of node j, kj and Γj is the degree of node j and the set
of neighbors of node j. θ is a tunable parameter and governs the strength of the node load. The definition of initial load is
reasonable because the product of the degree of node and the sumof the degree of its neighbors is in positive correlationwith
betweenness centrality [28,29]. As is known to all, the larger the node capacity is, the stronger the network robustness is.
However, the capacity of a node is severely limited by cost in real networks. Thus, Motter–Lai [30] assume that the capacity
of node is proportional to its initial load, Cj = (1+ δ)Lj(0), where Cj is the capacity of node j, δ(≥0) is a tolerance parameter.
Generally speaking, in real networks, such as Internet, when a router fails, the untreated information will be redistributed
to its neighbor nodes and the information flow tends to choose routers with high processing capacity so as to keep the
smooth of the whole network. So the load of removed node i will be redistributed to its nearest neighbor j, depending on
Πj = Cj−Lj(t)
n∈Γi (Cn−Ln(t))
. And the extra load allocated to node j is1Lji = Li(t) Cj−Lj(t)
n∈Γi (Cn−Ln(t))
, where Lj(t) is the load of the node j
after some time t .
The model of breakdown probability in Ref. [26] (WR model) can be described as:
P(Lj(t)) =

0, Cj > Lj(t)
Lj(t)− Cj
γ Cj − Cj , Cj ≤ Lj(t) < γ Cj
1, γ Cj ≤ Lj(t),
(1)
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where P(Lj(t)) is the breakdownprobability of a node j. Lj(t) and γ Cj represent the load of the node j after some time t and the
removal threshold that denotes P(Lj(t)) is 1when Lj(t) ≥ γ Cj. FromEq. (1), one can see that γ remains the same for all nodes
of the network,which is not conductive to the distribution of the protection resources. In real network such as transportation
network, the key nodes such as transportation hubs should be protected specially, and their breakdown probability should
be lower than other nodes. Considering this issue, we improved the model of breakdown probability. In the newmodel, we
use 1+ αkβj /⟨kβ⟩(α > 0) instead of γ (γ > 1). It is obvious that a tunable parameter β is added in the new model. And we
can explore the relationship between the robustness of network and the value of β . The new model can be described as:
P(Lj(t)) =

0, Cj > Lj(t)
Lj(t)− Cj
α(kβj /⟨kβ⟩)Cj
, Cj ≤ Lj(t) < (1+ αkβj /⟨kβ⟩)Cj
1, (1+ αkβj /⟨kβ⟩)Cj ≤ Lj(t),
(2)
where α > 0 and β are adjustable parameters. kj is the degree of node j, and
⟨kβ⟩ = 1
N
N
j=1
kβj , (3)
N is the total number of nodes in complex network.
Different from WR model proposed in Ref. [26], the removal threshold and topological structure are interrelated in the
current model. In order to facilitate the comparison and analysis, in Eq. (1) we set γ = 1+ α. Then Eq. (1) is a special case
of Eq. (2), i.e., the case β = 0.
According to previous work [6], the costw to protect the overload nodes can be defined as:
w = 1
N
N
j=1
(γj − 1), (4)
where γj is the removal threshold of node j. N is the total number of nodes in complex network.
As a general rule, themore protection resources applied to the node are, the lower breakdown probability the node earns.
So we naturally assume that the breakdown probability of a node is proportional to the protection resources allocated to
the node. So according to Eqs. (2) and (4), the distribution of protection resources over the entire network should obey the
rule below.
wj = γj − 1 = 1+ αkβj /⟨kβ⟩ − 1 = αkβj /⟨kβ⟩, (5)
Pj = wjN
m=1
wm
= αk
β
j /⟨kβ⟩
N
m=1
αkβm/⟨kβ⟩
= k
β
j
N
m=1
kβm
= k
β
j
N⟨kβ⟩ , (6)
wherewj is the protection resources allocated to node j, Pj is the proportion of the protection resources allocated to node j.
The value of α determines the total cost of the protection resources (W ), W = N · α. We can get the value of α according
to the total cost of protection resources we want to invest and the total number of the real network. While the value of β
determines the distribution of the breakdown probability of nodes in Eq. (2), i.e., the value of β determines the uniformity of
the allocation of protection resources in Eq. (6). In another word, if βr is the optimal vale of β that minimizes the avalanche
size according to Eq. (2), Pj = k
βr
j
N⟨kβr ⟩ is the optimal proportion of the protection resources allocated to node j. So in this paper
we firstly obtain the optimal value of β through the analysis of the network robustness based on the new cascading model,
and then apply the optimal value of β to Eq. (6), i.e., Pj = k
βr
j
N⟨kβr ⟩ is the optimal strategy to allocate the limited protection
resources.
To discuss the cascading failure more easily, we introduce PF i to evaluate the proportion of failure nodes due to the
removal of node i.
PF i = NF iN − 1 , (7)
where NF i is the number of failure nodes caused by the removal of node i. N is the total number of nodes in the complex
network. Obviously, 0 ≤ NF i ≤ N − 1.
Then, the average proportion of failure nodes (PF) due to the removal of one node of the entire network can be described
as
PF = 1
N
N
i=1
PF i. (8)
The lower the proportion of failure nodes is, the more robust against cascading failure the whole network is.
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Fig. 1. The effect of δ and β on the robustness of two typical networks against cascading failure for different value of α. (a) α = 0.3 and (b) α = 0.9 are
the simulation results on BA network, with N = 1000 and ⟨k⟩ = 8. (c) α = 0.3 and (d) α = 0.9 are the simulation results on WS network, with N = 1000
and ⟨k⟩ = 8. The color of the point represents the average proportion of failure nodes (PF) averaged over 10 realizations, plotted by the value of δ on the
horizontal axis and the value of β on the vertical. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to theweb version
of this article.)
3. Simulation and discussions
There are somany parameters in the newmodel. So one parameter need to be fixed. According to the theoretical analysis
in previous works [26,31], θ can be fixed. There exists a critical threshold δc at which a phrase transition occurs from normal
state to collapse. When δ > δc , the system maintains its normal and efficient functioning; while when δ < δc , PF suddenly
increases from 0 and cascading failure emerges because the capacity of each node is limited, propagating the whole or part
of the network to stop working. Therefore, δc is the smallest value of protection strength to avoid cascading failure. And the
cost of creating a network is proportional to δc . It has been proved that the network can reach the strongest robustness level
with the lowest value of δc when θ = 0.5 [26]. So all the simulations in this paper are based on the condition that θ = 0.5.
In real networks, the very common and conspicuous features are the small-world (SW) and scale-free (SF) properties [18].
In this paper, we consider two typical complex networks, including WS networks [9] derived from the model of Watts and
Strogatz and BA networks [10] derived from the model of Barabási and Albert. The two typical networks used in this paper
are all generated by Pajek, a program for analysis and visualization of large networks, withN = 1000 and ⟨k⟩ = 8, whereN is
the total number of nodes in complex network and ⟨k⟩ is the average degree of the complex network with ⟨k⟩ = 1N
N
j=1 kj.
In this research, PF is used to reflect the robustness of complex network against cascading failure. To this end, we remove
any one of nodes, such as node i, and calculate the proportion of failure nodes (PF i) induced by removing node i. Then the
average proportion of failure nodes PF is calculated by removing each node initially at each time, the detail can be seen in
Eq. (8), which provides a measure for the damage to the network. In this condition we explore the effect of δ and β on the
robustness of networks against cascading failure for different value of α. Each experimental result is the average value of 10
realizations for the same topology. Fig. 1 shows the simulation results on two typical networks.
From Fig. 1(a), (b), one can see that the average proportion of failure nodes (PF) is descending with the increase of δ until
there are no nodes failed. The same thing happens in WS network, which can be seen in Fig. 1(c), (d). Moreover, one can
see that PF (α = 0.9) is bigger than PF (α = 0.3) in both BA network and WS network. It indicates that the more the cost
of the protection resources is, the smaller PF is. The detail can be seen in Fig. 2. The experimental results shown in Fig. 2
clarify that PF is decreasing with the increase of α both in BA network and in WS network. Focus on the effect of β on the
robustness of complex network, one can see that in BA network (Fig. 1(a) (b)) PF is decreasing with the increase of β when
β ≤ 0, and PF presents ascendant trend after dropping first with the increase of β when β ≥ 0, which can be seen clearly
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Fig. 2. The average proportion of failure nodes PF as a function of β and α for fixed δ = 0.05 in BA and WS networks, with N = 1000 and ⟨k⟩ = 8.
PF averaged over 10 realizations is obtained via summation over all the avalanche sizes, by cutting each node initially at each time, divided by the total
number of nodes. Apparently, in the range of the larger PF, in two networks the robustness of two networks increases with increasing α.
Fig. 3. The average proportion of failure nodes PF as a function of δ and β in two typical networks with N = 1000 and ⟨k⟩ = 8 for different α. (a) BA
network, α = 0.3. (b) WS network, α = 0.3. (c) BA network, α = 0.9. (d) WS network, α = 0.9.
in Fig. 3. However, in WS network (Fig. 1(c), (d)), PF has no significant changes with the increase of β . It is known to us all
that the degree distribution is analogous to Poisson distribution in small world network while the degree distribution obeys
power law distribution in scale-free network. That is to say, in small world network, the degree distribution is relatively
homogeneous. However, in scale-free networks, only a few nodes own high degree, and most nodes own low degree. Thus,
kβj /⟨kβ⟩ in Eq. (2) ismore sensitive aboutβ in scale-free network than that in small world network. As a result, the numerical
change of PF with the change of β in BA network is more obvious than that in WS network. It indicates that the allocation
of protection resources has a great influence on the robustness of BA networks.
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Fig. 4. The relation between βr and δ for different α in BA network and WS network: (a) BA network. (b) WS network.
Fig. 5. Cascading failures in BA scale-free networks and WS networks with N = 1000 and the average degree ⟨k⟩ = 8 based on WR model and current
model (β = βr ): (a) BA network. (b) WS network. The red dotted curves reflect the relationship between PF and δ for different α based on WR model.
The blue curves present the relationship between PFmin and δ for different α based on current model, where PFmin is the minimum value of PF, which is
conducted by choosing the optimal value (β = βr ) of the parameters of the current model. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 3 shows the relationship between β and PF with different δ on two typical networks for different value of α. From
Fig. 3(a), (c), one can see that PF presents ascendant trend after dropping first with the increase of β in BA network. In
Fig. 3(b), (d), one can see the similar phenomenon inWS network. However, the trend shown inWS network is not obvious,
which is due to the homogeneous of the network. The curves shown in Fig. 3 indicate that there is a minimum value of PF
(PFmin)when β = βr(0 < βr < 2) for different α. Fig. 4 shows the relation between βr and δ for different α in BA network
and WS network. From Fig. 4(a), one can see that βr is increasing with the increase of α though a little fluctuation. And βr
is decreasing with the increase of δ though a little fluctuation. However, the relation between βr and δ shown in Fig. 4(b) is
unclear. Anyhow, the results shown in Fig. 4 give an optimal value of these parameters to allocate the protection resources,
which can make the network more robust. Fig. 5 shows the performance of the current model (β = βr) and WR model on
two typical networks. From the curves shown in Fig. 5 one can see that the proportion of failure nodes based on our model
with optimal value of β is lower than that based on WR model. Furthermore, it is again visible that the current model is
less of an improvement for the case of a WS network compared with that of a BA network. In small world networks, the
distribution of the degree of node is homogeneous. However, in BA network the degree distribution is heterogeneous. There
are only a few nodes with high degree and most nodes own lower degree in scale-free networks. So the change of β can
make great contribution to improve the robustness of network. As a result, the effectiveness of the current model is obvious
in scale-free networks. In most cases, there are not enough resource to prevent the cascading failure thoroughly, what can
be done is to reduce the avalanche size with limited cost. And the current model performswell in this issue. It can efficiently
allocate limited cost to make the network more robust by choosing the optimal value of the parameters (shown in Fig. 4).
Although typical model networks are useful in understanding how real networks behave, they cannot catch many of
the structural properties of real systems. To further illustrate the effectiveness of the current model on the distribution of
the protection resources, we apply it to analyze the USA airport network [32]. It is the network of 500 busiest commercial
airports in the United States. A tie exists between two airports if a flight was scheduled between them in 2002. Fig. 6 shows
the effect of δ and β on the robustness of airport networks against cascading failure for different value of α. From the
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Fig. 6. The effect of δ and β on the robustness of networks against cascading failure for different value of α in airport network with N = 500: (a) α = 0.1.
(b) α = 0.5. The color of the point represents the average proportion of failure nodes (PF) averaged over 10 realizations, plotted by the value of δ on the
horizontal axis and the value of β on the vertical. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to theweb version
of this article.)
Fig. 7. The robustness of airport network based on WR model and current model (β = βr ). (a) The relation between βr and δ for different α in airport
network. (b) Cascading failures in Airport network with N = 500 based on WR model and current model (β = βr ). The red dotted curves reflect the
relationship between PF and δ for different α based on WR model. The blue curves present the relationship between PFmin and δ for different α based on
current model, where PFmin is the minimum value of PF, which is conducted by choosing the optimal value of the parameters (β = βr ) of the current
model. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
simulation results, one can see that the value of PF is decreasing with the increase of β when the value of δ is small, which is
similar to that of BA network. It indicates that the airport network possesses scale-free property. Fig. 7(a) shows the relation
between βr and δ for different α in airport network. βr is the optimal value of β that can minimize the avalanche size of
airport network. One can find out the optimal value of β for the given δ and α in Fig. 7(a). Fig. 7 (b) shows the performance
of the current model (β = βr ) and WR model on airport networks. The blue curves in Fig. 7(b) represent the robustness of
airport network based on the current model with the distribution strategy of protection resources, Pj = k
βr
j
N⟨kβr ⟩ .
The experimental results of airport network show that ourmodel can be used in real network, and for these networks one
can find the optimal value of the parameters, and thenwe can get the distribution strategy of protection resources according
to Eq. (6) with the optimal value of β .
4. Conclusions
Cascading failures can do great harms to complex networks, especially to the Infrastructure networks. Protecting the
network against cascading failure with limited cost is particularly important. Different from many previous studies where
the node was removed immediately as soon as its load exceeded its capacity, we proposed a model with an improved
breakdown probability based on WR model. And some tunable parameters are introduced in our model. Furthermore, we
proposed a protection strategy corresponding to our new cascading model. One can explore the relationship between these
parameters and the robustness of network based on our cascading model and obtains the optimal value of parameter. Then
we can quantify how much the protection resources should be allocated to each node according to our protection strategy
with the optimal value of parameter. And the experimental results show that our model canmake the network more robust
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with the same cost compared with WR model. In addition, we explore the robustness of airport network against cascading
failure based on our model, and find the optimal value of parameter to allocate the protection resource, which improves
the robustness of airport network. From the simulation results, one can see that the future applications of our model and
protection strategy are not just limited to investigating theoretical networks, but can also help us to improve the robustness
of real networks.
Despite the advantages of our model compared to WR model, there are still some open questions. For example, our
model in this paper only considers the isolated network while real world systems are composed frommany interdependent
networks that interact with one another. So it is of great significance to research the effective models considering the
interdependent networks. And this is also our effort direction in our further research.
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